# Your SOC doesn't need another console. Your fleet needs an identity it can prove. Detection tools stack up, each one another dashboard an analyst babysits, and none of them stops abuse that passes auth or a source that rotates across three clouds. Whisper isn't another console. It's one primitive, the address is the identity, expressed as three planes that plug into the SOC you already run. `whisper verify --trustless` · anchored at the IANA DNS root. Our own API is not in the trust path. ## Everything below derives from one line: the address is the identity. A routable IPv6 /128 out of `2a04:2a01::/32` (announced by AS219419), deterministically derived from a key, DNSSEC-anchored, DANE-EE pinned, RDAP/WHOIS-registered: re-derivable and verifiable by anyone with `dig`. Most security tooling starts from an observation, a packet, a log line, a source IP, and tries to infer who is behind it. Whisper starts from the other end: it gives the thing an identity that is its address, cryptographically bound to a key you already hold, and publicly verifiable without trusting the issuer. Point it at a tractor, an implement ECU, a drone controller, or an AI agent, and the question "who is this?" stops being an inference and becomes a fact anyone can check. Three products fall out of that one primitive: not three integrations you wire together, three faces of the same address. ## One address, three jobs: who is this, who's really behind that, and what may talk to what. Identity answers who is this, provably. The attribution graph answers who's really behind a source that rotates. Agent governance answers what may talk to what. Each plane is useful alone; together they close both gaps every equipment-API attack leans on. ## A machine identity your backend authorizes on, not a bearer token anyone can present. This is the plane that closes the gap the equipment-API attacks live in: abuse that passes auth. Bind authority to the machine, not to a secret that whoever holds it can replay. Point the primitive at machines. Derive each tractor's, implement's or ECU's /128 from the hardware key it already holds in its secure element or TPM, with the 17-character equipment PIN or an implement/ECU serial as the domain separator. The private key never leaves the secure element; the address is a one-way function of its public half and the PIN. The backend then authorizes on the machine's pinned identity, not a stealable token, and a harvested grant with no leaf key behind it authenticates to nothing. "A leaked API key or a valid partner session looks legitimate; how do you catch abuse that passes auth?" You bind authority to the machine, not the bearer. State-changing commands terminate mutually-authenticated to the target machine's /128, the machine co-signs, so a platform or partner session can't reach a serial it can't cryptographically address. A request that passes auth but can't prove the identity never had authority in the first place. **A per-identity CA, not a shared root.** Each /128 carries its own leaf, deterministically derived and DANE-EE pinned: one key per machine, per ECU, per agent. Compromise one ECU and you've compromised that ECU, not the fleet. **The ISOBUS NAME is a claim; the /128 is a proof.** ISO 11783 gives every implement-bus device a 64-bit `NAME`, self-declared over J1939/CAN framing, and nothing on the bus can cryptographically verify it; AEF Guideline 040's ISOBUS security principles name exactly this class of gap. Whisper never touches the bus: it anchors the machine↔cloud IP boundary, where the same machine's derived /128 is provable by anyone against the IANA root. Attaches to what you already ship, the secure element or TPM, the ISOBUS NAME, the X.509 device-cert mTLS your equipment cloud already runs, as the publicly verifiable, DNSSEC/DANE-anchored layer on top. No bespoke CA trust store to push to every machine; revocation at DNS-TTL speed instead of CRL/OCSP soft-fail. [Standards mapping →](/oem-security) ## Attribution that survives IP rotation, because it fingerprints the operator, not the exit. This is the plane that closes the other gap: the data broker who rotates across Amazon, Google and Azure or a residential-proxy swarm until your SOC only ever logs a meaningless last IP. A live internet-infrastructure graph, 7.44B nodes and 39.3B relationships of fused BGP, DNS, WHOIS, TLS, hosting and threat intelligence, answering in under 300 ms, pulls two levers, kept honestly separate. For cloud rotation it clusters shared ASN, hosting and certificate lineage into one infrastructure genealogy. For a residential-proxy swarm, where a subscriber IP gives an infra graph nothing to grab, a `JA4/JA3` client fingerprint travels with the tooling regardless of the exit and collapses the swarm to one operator. The egress IP is the one thing this plane never relies on. "When they rotate residential proxies and fresh cloud IPs, can you actually attribute them, or just rate-limit an IP and move on?" Track them. Infrastructure genealogy collapses the cloud rotation; a JA4 client fingerprint collapses the residential swarm. Every answer returns a reproducible, replayable JSON evidence chain your SOC, your auditors and a regulator can hand around. ### `identify(ip)` Who really operates a host, even behind a CDN, across any cloud. ### `origins(prefix)` + `walk(node,depth)` Cluster rotating IPs into one infrastructure genealogy. ### `history` / `watch` A timeline of an operator and a standing sentinel, plus `variants(domain)` to catch typosquat OEM and FMIS domains before they activate. ### read-only Cypher Express "one source touching N distinct machine-identities in a window" as a query your agent runs, not a ticket your analyst files. Additive to the SOC and SIEM: the same fingerprints power external attack-surface mapping and dependency blast-radius (if a cloud region goes dark, which farms lose telemetry). [Trace the full back-trace →](/equipment-api-abuse) ## The same primitive governs the autonomous machines and AI agents your fields already run. Autonomous 9RX-class tractors work fields with nobody in the cab, ag drones fly under FAA Remote ID, and agronomy copilots read and write farm data on a grower's behalf. Each is an agent making network calls, and today "which one did this" is a shrug at a shared NAT address. Whisper does it with identity instead of trust. ### Which agent did this is the source address Every autonomous machine, drone controller and agronomy agent egresses from its own routable /128: attribution, not a guess. ### Every query and connection is logged per-agent Queryable live via `op:logs`: a per-agent record, not a shared firehose. The trail the farmer can be shown. ### Policy on every query A graph-first resolver and bound egress enforce category, geography, ownership and routing: default deny, allow or block by name or subdomain. An autonomous tractor that should only ever reach its OEM's ops endpoints simply can't reach anything else. ### Inbound agents are verifiable FCrDNS, RDAP, `whisper verify`: "trust the bearer token / the description field" becomes a checkable fact. Per-agent budgets, a kill-switch, one `revoke`. ## The three planes drop into the systems your fleet already runs, at the IP and cloud boundary, never inside the bus. Whisper anchors the cloud, not the hitch. Each surface below is a proposed integration onto a system you already operate; the machine-identity /128 is the one capability that is shipped and live today. Every one is additive: it complements whatever authenticates the message, and it never reaches into the closed, safety-critical layers: the ISOBUS/J1939 bus, tractor-implement (TIM) functional safety, the drone's Remote-ID broadcast. - **John Deere Operations Center** (the keystone FMIS surface): every sanctioned data consumer calling the platform APIs becomes one verifiable /128 the platform can allowlist, so an OAuth grant (12-hour access, 365-day refresh) replayed from an unknown address is separable from the real integration. Complements the platform's OAuth 2.0. - **Secure element / TPM in the telematics gateway** (shipped & live): derives the routable /128 from the same non-exportable device key and publishes a DANE-verifiable, RDAP-registered name bound to it. - **ISOBUS · ISO 11783 / AEF Guideline 040**: the 64-bit ISOBUS NAME is a self-declared claim on the CAN bus; Whisper gives the same machine a cryptographically provable public counterpart at the IP boundary. Never touches the bus or TIM. - **Cross-brand data exchange** (DataConnect-style, four OEM/FMIS clouds): each party in the chain carries a verifiable /128, so "who accessed this grower's data, from which cloud" survives the brand boundary. - **Ag drones** (FAA Remote ID, Part 89): the ground control station, fleet backend and USS endpoints each get a verifiable /128; the Part-89 broadcast stays untouched. - **Irrigation & LPWAN sensor networks**: the gateway that concentrates a thousand field sensors gets one provable /128 with default-deny egress. Read together, these are the doors the EU Data Act (in force since 12 Sep 2025, and reaching connected farm machinery) forces open to user-chosen third parties, at the exact moment ISO 24882 asks the industry to monitor and control its machine connectivity. The Data Act makes you open the doors; Whisper is the doorway that knows who walked through and can shut it on one. [Standards mapping →](/oem-security) ## Five things you can't stand up overnight, and a competitor can't clone from a slide. A platform is only as durable as what sits underneath it. Whisper's three planes rest on five load-bearing pillars, each a real, checkable fact rather than a claim on a roadmap. ### Real routable space, not a namespace we invented AS219419 and `2a04:2a01::/32` are announced to the global routing table. You cannot allocate verifiable identities from address space you don't hold and can't announce. ### A graph you accrete, not one you query once 7.44B nodes and 39.3B relationships of BGP, DNS, WHOIS, TLS, hosting and threat intel, built over years. History is the one thing you can't buy this afternoon. ### A per-identity CA, so blast radius is one One deterministically-derived leaf per machine, ECU or agent: DANE-EE pinned, never a shared intermediate. ### Registry-anchored and root-anchored Every /128 is a real RDAP/WHOIS object, and the whole chain validates through DNSSEC to the IANA root. `whisper verify --trustless` checks an identity without trusting Whisper. "Agtech startups fold and strand their customers. Will you still be here in five years, and is this real or a checkbox?" It's infrastructure, and it's built by people who ran the internet's plumbing. Real routable address space at AS219419, run by a team that operated one of the internet's regional address registries and one of its root DNS servers. You can verify every claim on this page yourself, today, without an account. ## Exercise all three planes yourself; our API isn't in the trust path. Two tiers, by design. No key: verify a machine's identity, trustless, anchored at the IANA root. Your key: back-trace a suspicious host across any cloud, register a machine, govern its agents, revoke it worldwide. ```sh # plane 1: re-derive and verify any machine's identity, trustless $ whisper verify --trustless 2a04:2a01:1c0::a6f1 ✓ DNSSEC chain valid to the IANA root ✓ DANE-EE (TLSA) leaf matches the identity's key ✓ RDAP: registered under AS219419 · 2a04:2a01::/32 identity: VERIFIED, and our own API was never trusted # the address is the machine: reverse DNS names it $ dig -x 2a04:2a01:1c0::a6f1 +short pin-1agcm82633a.farm.example-oem.whisper.online. # plane 2: with your key, attribute who really operates a host via the public graph API $ curl -s https://graph.whisper.security/api/query -H "X-API-Key: whisper_live_xxx" \ -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"query":"CALL whisper.identify(\"34.90.x.x\")"}' operator: · seen across AWS / GCP / Azure residential swarm collapsed by JA4: same tooling, 41 exit IPs → 1 operator ``` ```sh # plane 1: give a machine a name it can prove $ export WHISPER_API_KEY=whisper_live_xxx # --pin/--from-secure-element are on the roadmap; today the 17-char PIN rides the live control-plane vin arg (see docs) $ whisper register --pin 1AGC… --from-secure-element → identity 2a04:2a01:1c0::a6f1 DNSSEC + DANE live # plane 3: govern what its agents may reach, and read the per-agent log $ whisper policy set --default deny --allow ops.example-oem.com,updates.example-oem.com $ whisper logs --identity 2a04:2a01:1c0::a6f1 --tail $ whisper revoke 2a04:2a01:1c0::a6f1 # owner-thrown, publicly verifiable, at DNS-TTL ``` ## Three planes, and all three exit into the stack you already run, not a new silo. ### Feeds your SIEM, not another console A machine-readable feed into your SIEM: the Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel and OpenCTI connectors ship today. Findings map to CEF and ECS fields and arrive as a signed, replayable JSON evidence chain, with STIX 2.1 over TAXII export on the roadmap. ### Speaks your compliance language Maps to ISO 24882 and AEF Guideline 040 evidence, the EU Data Act's authorized-party line, and the Ag Data Transparent promise. ### In your auth path, and safe there If your backend authorizes against the DANE/verify path, that plane is built to fail open: a Whisper outage never parks a tractor mid-harvest; checks degrade to your existing anchors. Anycast on AS219419, no single node in the path. ### Flat, predictable pricing Per-machine/year and flat: not per-transaction, not usage-metered, not per-acre. [See pricing →](/pricing) ### On-prem or your own tenant Data residency and GDPR by construction: the graph and the per-agent logs stay where your regulator, and your growers, need them. ### Where it fits vs. what you run Depth on top of your behavioral SOC and threat-intel: it makes them sharper, it doesn't replace them. [See the comparison →](/compare) ## One primitive. Three planes. Give every machine an identity it can prove. Identity, an attribution graph that survives IP rotation, and per-agent governance: additive to your SOC, mapped to your standards, priced so you can say yes. Keyless to try, one call to provision, one more to revoke. Or run `whisper verify --trustless` right now.